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RECENT CASE

DIRECTV, INC. V. IMBURGIA
Supreme Court Holds California Court’s Interpretation
Preempted by Federal Arbitration Act
Angelica Sanchez Vega∗
INTRODUCTION
It is no secret that alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has become an
important part of the contemporary American legal system. Compared to
full-fledged judicial proceedings, ADR methods, including arbitration,
offer a more cost-effective alternative. Both private and public entities
have embraced the chance to address legal disputes while using resources
more effectively. In 1998, for example, President Clinton issued a
memorandum to the heads of executive departments and agencies
encouraging the use of ADR “[a]s part of an effort to make the Federal
Government operate in a more efficient and effective manner.” 1 In spite of
all of the benefits of ADR, concerns about the innate fairness of these
methods of dispute resolution still abound. Nowhere are such concerns
more evident than in the context of arbitration agreements between large,
sophisticated entities and individual consumers.
Despite concerns as to the implicit fairness of ADR, the enforcement
of arbitration agreements in American courts has been markedly
strengthened by one important piece of legislation: the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA). 2 The FAA was proclaimed as “[a]n Act [t]o make valid and
enforceable written provisions or agreements for arbitration of disputes
arising out of contracts, maritime transactions, or commerce among the

∗ Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2017; M.B.A.,
Bellarmine University, 2013; B.A., Bellarmine University, 2009.
1 Memorandum from President Clinton to the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies
(May
1,
1998),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olp/docs/1998.05.01CLINTON.pdf.
2 Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–15
(2012)).
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States or Territories or with foreign nations.” 3 This single piece of
legislation has been the subject of a number of Supreme Court cases,
including the important Southland Corp. v. Keating 4 decision. In
Southland, the Supreme Court held that the FAA applies in state courts and
preempts conflicting state law. 5 On December 14, 2015, the Supreme
Court added an additional chapter to the history of the FAA through its
decision in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia. 6 The Supreme Court in DIRECTV
held that California law making arbitration waivers unenforceable is
preempted by the FAA. 7
I.

BACKGROUND

At issue in DIRECTV were sections 9 and 10 of DIRECTV’s service
agreement. Section 9 of the agreement provided that any claim would be
resolved only by binding arbitration 8 and stated that “if ‘the law of your
state’ made the waiver of class arbitration unenforceable, then the entire
arbitration provision” would be unenforceable. 9 Section 10 provided that
the FAA governs section 9 of the agreement. 10
Section 9 was of particular relevance in the state of California. In
2005, the California Supreme Court decided Discover Bank v. Superior
Court, 11 holding that waivers of class arbitration in consumer adhesion
contracts were unconscionable, and thus not enforceable. 12 This holding
was eventually dubbed California’s “Discover Bank rule.” 13 It was within
this legal context that, in 2008, Amy Imburgia and Kathy Greiner
commenced a lawsuit in California state court against DIRECTV. 14 About
three years of litigation ensued, but then in 2011 the United States Supreme
Court issued its opinion in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. 15
Concepcion held that the FAA preempted California’s Discover Bank
rule. 16 Given the development produced by Concepcion, DIRECTV asked
Federal Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. at 883.
465 U.S. 1 (1984).
Id. at 16–17.
136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
Id. at 471.
Id. at 466 (citing Joint Appendix at 128, DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. 463 (No. 14-462)).
Id. (quoting Joint Appendix, supra note 8, at 129).
10 Id. (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 8, at 129).
11 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563
U.S. 333 (2011).
12 Id. at 1103, 1108.
13 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 340.
14 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 466. Imburgia and Greiner sought damages for early
termination fees that they alleged violated California law. Id.
15 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
16 Id. at 352.
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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the trial court to send the matter to arbitration pursuant to section 9 of the
service agreement. 17 The trial court, however, denied DIRECTV’s request,
and the company appealed. 18 The California Court of Appeal affirmed the
trial court’s decision, noting that under California law as existing when
DIRECTV drafted the agreement, such prohibition on class arbitration was
unenforceable. 19 Furthermore, the court of appeal found that while
Concepcion invalidated California’s rule, the FAA gives the parties the
freedom to choose governing law irrespective of federal preemption. 20 To
support its conclusion, the court of appeal set forth two reasons: (1) the
provision stating that the FAA governed was a general provision of the
service agreement, while the provision voiding arbitration if the “law of
your state” found a class arbitration waive unenforceable was a specific
provision; and (2) the common law rule that ambiguous language in a
contract should be construed against the drafter of the contract. 21 The
California Supreme Court denied discretionary review and DIRECTV filed
a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was granted. 22
II.

ANALYSIS

Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for the majority. The majority
framed the issue as “not whether [the California Court of Appeal’s]
decision is a correct statement of California law but whether (assuming it
is) that state law is consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act.” 23 In
particular, as the majority explained, the issue was whether the California
Court of Appeal’s decision rested upon “grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract” as prescribed by the FAA. 24 The
majority’s opinion answered this question in the negative.
According to the majority, the California Court of Appeal interpreted
the language “law of your state” to include invalid state law. 25 Such
interpretation was deemed unacceptable by the Court because it precludes
arbitration contracts from standing on equal footing with other types of
contracts. 26 In support of its conclusion, the majority outlined six reasons.
DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 466.
Id.
Id. at 467 (citing Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 194 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2014), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015)).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 467–68.
23 Id. at 468.
24 Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)).
25 Id. at 469.
26 Id. (“After examining the grounds upon which the Court of Appeal rested its
decision, we conclude that California courts would not interpret contracts other than
arbitration contracts the same way.”).
17
18
19
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First, contrary to the opinion of the California Court of Appeal, the
majority found that the contract language was not ambiguous. 27 In the
majority’s view, absent any other indication in the contract, the contract’s
provision for “the law of your state” is governed by its ordinary meaning:
valid state law, not including invalid state law. 28 Second, California law
itself clarified how to interpret the language in question. 29 Citing Doe v.
Harris, 30 the majority noted that California law incorporates the California
Legislature’s power to change the law retroactively, and thus the law as
announced in Harris would govern the scope of the phrase “law of your
state.” 31 Third, from the majority’s perspective, the California Court of
Appeal’s reasoning did not suggest that it would apply the same reasoning
in any other context outside of arbitration. 32 According to the majority,
there is
nothing in [the court of appeal’s] opinion (nor in any other California
case) suggesting that California would generally interpret words such as
“law of your state” to include state laws held invalid because they
conflict with, say, federal labor statutes, federal pension statutes, federal
33
antidiscrimination laws, the Equal Protection Clause, or the like.

Fourth, the California Court of Appeal’s language focused exclusively
on arbitration, which suggested to the majority that the court of appeal
meant to limit its holding to the particular subject matter of arbitration. 34
Fifth, the Court outright rejected the suggestion that state law, in this case
California’s Discover Bank rule, maintains independent force after prior
invalidation by a Supreme Court decision. 35 Sixth, no additional principle
was invoked by the court of appeal suggesting that the same interpretation
of the phrase “law of your state” would be applied by California courts in
other contexts outside of arbitration. 36 While the majority recognized the
court of appeal’s invocation of the specific exception to the agreement’s
general adoption of the FAA, such a reading “tells us nothing about how to
interpret the words ‘law of your state’ elsewhere.” 37
Justice Thomas provided a brief dissent in which he restated his belief
that the FAA does not apply in state courts, and as such he would affirm

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Id.
Id.
Id.
302 P.3d 598, 601–02 (Cal. 2013).
DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 469.
Id.
Id. at 469–70.
Id. at 470.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the decision of the California Court of Appeal. 38 The more detailed
critique of the majority’s opinion was presented by Justice Ginsburg, who,
joined by Justice Sotomayor, took a more critical view of the FAA’s
expanding scope. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg explained that given the
precedent on the subject of the FAA, she “would take no further step to
disarm consumers, leaving them without effective access to justice.” 39
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent focused on the role of DIRECTV as the
drafter of the agreement, and she considered it “particularly appropriate” to
interpret any ambiguity against DIRECTV. 40 This common law rule of
interpretation had “particular force” because the California Court of Appeal
applied it to a standardized contract. 41 Furthermore, according to Justice
Ginsburg, the plaintiffs were unlikely to anticipate in 2007—when they
entered into the agreement with DIRECTV—the Supreme Court’s 2011
Concepcion decision invalidating their state’s Discover Bank rule. 42 In
Justice Ginsburg’s view, the interpretation of the contract given by the
California Court of Appeal was “not only reasonable, [but also] entirely
right.” 43
As a preliminary matter, Justice Ginsburg framed arbitration as “a
matter of ‘consent, not coercion.’” 44 Accordingly, in Justice Ginsburg’s
view, “[a]llowing DIRECTV to reap the benefit of an ambiguity it could
have avoided would ignore not just the hugely unequal bargaining power of
the parties, but also their reasonable expectations at the time the contract
was formed.” 45 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg noted that historically the

38 Id. at 471 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas’s belief that the FAA only
applies in federal courts, and not in state courts, stems from disagreement with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Southland. Justice Thomas’s reasoning on this point was further
detailed in his dissent in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, where he stated:
[N]ot until 1959—nearly 35 years after Congress enacted the FAA—did any court
suggest that § 2 [of the FAA] applied in state courts. . . . The explanation for this
delay is simple: The statute that Congress enacted actually applies only in federal
courts. At the time of the FAA’s passage in 1925, laws governing the
enforceability of arbitration agreements were generally thought to deal purely with
matters of procedure rather than substance, because they were directed solely to
the mechanisms for resolving the underlying disputes.
513 U.S. 265, 286 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Robert Lawrence Co. v.
Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1959)).
39 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 471 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 472.
41 Id. at 475.
42 Id. at 472 (quoting Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 196 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2014)).
43 Id. at 473.
44 Id. (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681
(2010)).
45 Id. at 475.
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Supreme Court has respected state court interpretations’ of arbitration
agreements. 46 Thus, in her view, the DIRECTV decision is “a dangerous
first.” 47
In order to reach such a radically different conclusion from the
majority’s opinion, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent reconciled the reasoning of
the California Court of Appeal with the Court’s decision in Concepcion by
adopting a narrower reading of Concepcion. According to Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent, Concepcion “held only that a State cannot compel a
party to engage in class arbitration when the controlling agreement
unconditionally prohibits class procedures.” 48
Thus, from Justice
Ginsburg’s perspective, the majority in DIRECTV oversteps the framework
laid out in Concepcion. By overstepping Concepcion’s framework, the
majority effectively maintains that “it no longer matters whether DIRECTV
meant California’s ‘home state laws’ when it drafted the 2007 version of its
service agreement.” 49
Justice Ginsburg also underscored the fact that the FAA allows parties
to choose governing law. 50 Accordingly, for Justice Ginsburg, the
dispositive question is “whether the parties intended the ‘law of your state’
provision to mean state law as preempted by federal law . . . or home state
law as framed by the California Legislature, without considering the
preemptive effect of federal law.” 51 The latter of these two alternative
readings is deemed the more adequate reading in Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent. 52
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent does concede that the FAA has been
construed as a “federal policy favoring arbitration.” 53 However, she
reminds readers of the limits of FAA application as voiced in the 2010
Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters 54 decision. In
Granite Rock, the Supreme Court cautioned that a presumption favoring
arbitration should apply “only where it reflects, and derives its legitimacy
from, a judicial conclusion that arbitration of a particular dispute is what
the parties intended because their express agreement to arbitrate was
validly formed and . . . is legally enforceable and best construed to
encompass the dispute.” 55 Given the disparity in bargaining power
Id. at 473.
Id.
Id. (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 474.
Id.
Id. at 475 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989)).
54 561 U.S. 287 (2010).
55 Id. at 303.
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
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between individual consumers and a sophisticated entity such as
DIRECTV, Justice Ginsburg considers the majority’s opinion not only a
step beyond Concepcion, but also a misreading of the FAA that effectively
deprives consumers of relief against entities that write prohibitions on class
arbitration into their form contracts. 56 According to Justice Ginsburg, the
decision in DIRECTV holds that “consumers lack not only protection
against unambiguous class-arbitration bans in adhesion contracts. They
lack even the benefit of the doubt when anomalous terms . . . could be
construed to protect their rights.” 57
Justice Ginsburg closes her critique of the majority’s opinion with a
reminder of the context in which the FAA was originally enacted,
highlighting that the FAA was meant to enforce arbitration agreements
between parties of relatively equal bargaining power. 58 According to
Justice Ginsburg, “Congress in 1925 could not have anticipated that the
Court would apply the FAA to render consumer adhesion contracts
invulnerable to attack by parties who never meaningfully agreed to
arbitration in the first place.” 59 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg also points to
section 2 of the FAA—on which the majority relies—and its prescription
that arbitration provisions ought to be treated like other contractual terms
with the implication that such terms should not receive any type of
preferential treatment. 60 Justice Ginsburg finally notes the marked
divergence of DIRECTV’s holding with the way in which mandatory
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are treated abroad.61 Citing a
1993 European Union Directive which forbids binding consumers to unfair
contractual terms, 62 and a subsequent EU Recommendation interpreting the
Directive, 63 Justice Ginsburg underscores how consumer disputes in the
European Union are arbitrated only when the parties mutually agree on
arbitration on a “post-dispute basis.” 64
DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 476 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. Highlighting that consumers have not always lacked “the benefit of the doubt,”
Justice Ginsburg references two previous Supreme Court cases, one dating as far back as
1953. Id. at 476 n.3 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435, 438 (1953); Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)).
58 Id. at 477 (citing Margaret L. Moses, Arbitration Law: Who’s in Charge?, 40
SETON HALL L. REV. 147, 170–71 (2010)).
59 Id. at 477–78 (citing Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of
Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2860
(2015)).
60 Id. at 478.
61 Id.
62 Council Directive 93/13, art. 3, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 31.
63 Commission Recommendation 98/257, 1998 O.J. (L 115) 34.
64 Id. at 478 (quoting Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the
U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of
the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831, 847–48 (2002)).
56
57
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CONCLUSION
The majority in DIRECTV anchored its reasoning in the language of
the FAA itself, and the status of California’s Discover Bank rule vis-à-vis
federal law. The outcome was not surprising, particularly for those that
have followed recent FAA litigation before the Court. However, DIRECTV
is significant in at least two aspects: (1) it reflects the Supreme Court’s
sensitivity to the “different” or more stringent treatment that state courts
might give arbitration agreements, and (2) it suggests that under the current
legal landscape consumer advocates’ concerns might be more effectively
addressed through legislative action rather than through litigation.
Consumer groups and individual consumers may find the “equal
footing” reasoning by the majority to be a little ironic. The Supreme Court
is forthcoming about ensuring the equal treatment of all contracts (whether
they are arbitration agreements or not), but contrary to what many
consumer advocate groups may wish, the majority in DIRECTV does not
dwell on Justice Ginsburg’s concerns regarding the disparity in bargaining
power between individual consumers and more sophisticated entities. As
caustic to individual consumer rights as such rationale may appear, it is
difficult to fault the majority for deeming the language used by DIRECTV
to be unambiguous, and applying the ordinary meaning of the phrase “law
of your state.” The reasoning used by the California Court of Appeal
which interpreted “law of your state” to include invalid state law proved
simply too odd of an argument for the Supreme Court to accept. After all,
to hold that the California Court of Appeal reasonably read the phrase
would have required the Supreme Court to dilute the force of its previous
Concepcion decision, which struck down California’s Discover Bank rule.
Such a retreat would have undoubtedly opened the door to additional
questions about the independent force of other state laws previously
considered preempted by other Supreme Court decisions.
Regardless of whether or not the holding of DIRECTV truly makes
consumer form contracts with prohibitions on class arbitration completely
invulnerable to attack, as described in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, the
outcome of DIRECTV should serve as a demarcation, a sort of tipping
point, for consumer advocate groups. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent echoes
several of the practical concerns related to the asymmetric bargaining
positions between individual consumers and companies that prohibit class
arbitration in form contracts, and raises important questions about the
legislative intent of the FAA. However, as time passes and the use of
arbitration becomes more commonplace, it also becomes more difficult to
ignore its attractive qualities—chiefly its time and cost efficiencies.
Nonetheless, after DIRECTV, it should be rather clear that any desired
rebalancing of bargaining power between individual consumers and
sophisticated entities will not be effectuated through the courts, at least not
any time soon. Instead, DIRECTV calls for consumer advocacy groups to
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more aggressively focus their efforts on persuading the legislature to make
any desired changes. Of course, legislative efforts would require a higher
degree of concerted organization, and such efforts will likely face strong
opposition from the entities who will continue to seek the benefits of costeffective, legally enforceable methods of dispute resolution.

